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1. Introduction 
The additive model of reasons: 
Whether or not one ought to 𝜙 is determined by the weighted sum of pro tanto 
reasons for and against 𝜙ing. The weights are given by the normative force or 
strength of each reason. One ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, the sum total weight of 
the reasons for 𝜙ing exceeds the sum total weight of the reasons against.2 
This paper presents a dilemma for the additive model. Either the additive model 
accommodates disjunctive cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just in case at least one of 
two factors obtains, or it accommodates conjunctive cases in which one ought to 𝜙 
just in case both of two factors obtain. There exist both conjunctive and disjunctive 
cases. Hence the additive model is extensionally inadequate. The upshot of the 
dilemma is that one of the most influential accounts of how reasons accrue to 
determine what we ought to do is flawed. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
presents the dilemma. Section 4 argues that there exists no plausible modification 
to the model that avoids the dilemma. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Additive Model 
Comparativism is the view that the comparative weight of reasons for and against 
performing some act 𝜙 is the sole determinant of 𝜙’s deontic status, i.e. whether or 
 
1 Now at Google. Email: gkeeling@stanford.edu.   
2 Here 𝜙 is a variable that refers to an act or judgement-sensitive attitude such as believing, 
desiring, hoping, or fearing that something is the case (Scanlon 1998: 20). 𝜙 is treated as an 
act hereafter for brevity. A pro tanto reason is a reason which has genuine weight but which 
can in principle be outweighed by countervailing considerations (Kagan 1989: 17n). Here 
the term ‘reason’ is used to mean pro tanto reason throughout. Furthermore, ‘one ought to 
𝜙’ is understood as having overall, all-things-considered, or most reason to 𝜙. That one has 
overall reason to 𝜙 does not imply that one has an additional reason to 𝜙 (Dancy 2004: 16). 
The relevant sense of ought is assumed to be permission and not requirement throughout.  
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not one ought or has overall reason to 𝜙 (Chang 2016: 215; Tucker forthcoming).3  
The idea is that 𝜙’s deontic status is settled in a competition between conflicting 
reasons that count for and against 𝜙ing to differing degrees (Berker 2007: 113-8; 
Broome 2004: 36-8; Lord and Maguire 2016: 4-9; Snedegar 2018). The standard 
metaphor is a pair of scales: Reasons for 𝜙 are placed in one pan, reasons against 
are placed in the other, and one ought to 𝜙 if the balance of reasons favours 𝜙ing. 
The additive model gives a straightforward and literal analysis of the weighing 
metaphor.4 The weights of the reasons for and against 𝜙ing add up to determine 
𝜙’s deontic status. One ought to 𝜙, in the sense of being permitted as opposed to 
required to 𝜙, just in case the sum total weight of the reasons for 𝜙ing exceeds the 
sum total weight of the reasons against. The commitment here is that reasons are 
separable (Lord and Maguire 2016: 13-14). What it means for reasons to be 
separable is that the weight that each reason contributes to the combined weight of 
a set of reasons can be assessed independently of the weight that other reasons 
contribute. Reasons are separable if they do not interfere with one another. In 
particular, whether a feature of a situation grounds a reason for or against 𝜙ing is 
not conditional on the obtaining or non-obtaining of other reasons that count for or 
against 𝜙ing or on the weights of those reasons. Furthermore, the weight of any 
particular reason for or against 𝜙ing does not depend on facts about the obtaining 
or non-obtaining of other reasons for or against 𝜙ing or their weights. 
The upshot of the additive model is twofold. On one hand, as Errol Lord and 
Barry Maguire (2016: 14) explain, ‘additivity, or something like it, is attractive 
because it is intuitive, workable, and theoretically straightforward.’ In particular, 
the additive model provides a plausible metaphysical basis for the phenomenology 
of deliberation in that it accounts for the sense in which competing considerations 
pull in different directions when we decide between alternatives. On the other 
hand, the model makes good on the use of contrast cases in normative theorising. 
That is, the method of establishing the normative relevance of particular factors by 
permuting one factor across two cases that hold fixed all other factors and showing 
that there is a normative difference between the cases (Kagan 1988: 14-18). Indeed, 
 
3 Chang (2016: 214-5) distinguishes reasons and value comparativism. The latter holds that 
comparative facts about values determine deontic status. Both views originate in the 1930s, 
most notably with Ross (1930, 1939) but also Broad (1930: 276-85). For early discussions 
of comparativism see Bair (1958: Ch. 3), Nagel (1979: Ch. 7), and Scanlon (1998: 65-66). 
4 For some recent and closely related discussions of reasons additivity see Dietrich and List 
(2013), Titelbaum (2019), Nair (forthcoming) and Wedgwood (forthcoming). For an 
excellent discussion of reasons accrual that is not strictly additive see Sher (2019). 
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such is the abductive standing of additivity that some claim, like Roger Crisp, that 
the aim of normative theorising is that of locating the ‘reason-giving properties of 
which we can safely assume the “additive assumption” holds’ (Crisp 2000: 35f). 
The additive model is formalised as follows. First, a situation or state of affairs 
can be decomposed into normatively relevant factors 𝑥𝑖 for 𝑖 ∈ {1,2,3, … , 𝑛}. Each 
factor either obtains or fails to obtain. Accordingly, each factor 𝑥𝑖 can be treated as 
a Boolean such that 𝑥𝑖 = 1 if factor 𝑖 obtains, else 𝑥𝑖 = −1. To illustrate: Suppose 
𝜙 is the act of going to the dentist, and that the normatively relevant factors in this 
case are, first, whether or not one has a toothache (𝑥1), and second, whether or not 
one will have to pay for the appointment (𝑥2). A situation is an assignment of 
values to factors. For example, one situation is where one has a toothache and one 
does not have to pay for the appointment, i.e. 𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥2 = −1. Another is 
where one does not have a toothache and one does not have to pay, i.e. 𝑥1 = −1 
and 𝑥2 = −1. Accordingly, each situation can be described as a vector, or an 
ordered list of 1s and −1s, which describes the normatively relevant features of the 
situation, i.e. 𝐱 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛) ∈ {1, −1}
𝑛. Here {1, −1}𝑛 = {1, −1} × … ×
{1, −1} is the factor space (the product set containing the 2𝑛 possible situations). 
The factors are assumed to satisfy a logical independence condition such that for 
any 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 such that 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗, each value of 𝑥𝑖 is compatible with each value of 𝑥𝑗.
5 
Each factor 𝑥𝑖 has a real-valued weight 𝑤𝑖 representing the polarity and weight 
of the reason for or against 𝜙ing contributed by 𝑥𝑖. The sign of 𝑤𝑖 represents the 
polarity of the reason. If 𝑤𝑖 is positive, then 𝑥𝑖 = 1 counts for 𝜙ing, and 𝑥𝑖 = −1 
counts against.6 If 𝑤𝑖 is negative, 𝑥𝑖 = 1 counts against 𝜙ing, and 𝑥𝑖 = −1 counts 
for 𝜙ing. The magnitude of 𝑤𝑖 reflects the strength of the reason. The further 𝑤𝑖 is 
from 0, the stronger the reason. Call the reasons in a case 𝐰 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2, … , 𝑤𝑛). 
 
5 Factor independence is required for non-trivial separability of reasons (Bader 2016: 51-
55). Factor 𝑥1 is separable from factor 𝑥2 just in case (𝑎, 𝑐) ≥ (𝑏, 𝑐) ↔ (𝑎, 𝑑) ≥ (𝑏, 𝑑) for 
all 𝑎, 𝑏 in the domain of 𝑥1 and all 𝑐, 𝑑 in the domain of 𝑥2. Here ≥ is an ordering over the 
(sub-)vectors in {1, −1}𝑛 that ranks the (sub-)vectors in terms of the strength of the overall 
reason for 𝜙ing given the assignment of values to factors. If dependencies exist between the 
factors such that certain factor values cannot be combined, the rectangular field assumption 
will not hold (c.f. Broome 1991: 80-81). The ordering ≥ may be strongly separable over 
factors and thus additively representable but the separability in this case will be trivial. 
6 Snedegar (2018) discusses the treatment of reasons for and against in the additive model. 
Balancing is zero-sum. A reason that counts to some degree for 𝜙ing is taken to count 
against ¬𝜙ing to that same degree. The non-obtaining of a feature that counts for 𝜙ing to 
some degree is taken to count as a reason in favour of ¬𝜙ing to that same degree. Section 
4.4. shows that something close to the dilemma raised against the additive model also arises 
if the non-obtaining of factors is assumed to have zero as opposed to negative reason-giving 
forced. On this model, disjunctive and not conjunctive cases can be accommodated. 
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Finally, there is some function, 𝜎, sometimes called the combinatorial function or 
the governing function, that takes as its input the reasons for and against 𝜙ing, and 
outputs whether or not one ought to 𝜙 (Berker 2007: 121; Kagan 1988: 14; see also 
Nagel 1979: 128). The additive model holds that the function is additive. The 
combinatorial function can be formulated with one of two thresholds.  
Strict Threshold: One ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, the sum total weight of the 
reasons for 𝜙ing strictly outweighs the sum total weight of the reasons against 
𝜙ing, i.e. 𝜎(Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖) = 1 if Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 > 0, else 𝜎(Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖) = −1. 
Weak Threshold: One ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, the sum total weight of the 
reasons for 𝜙ing is at least as great as the sum total weight of the reasons 
against 𝜙ing, i.e. 𝜎(Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖) = 1 if Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0, else 𝜎(Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖) = −1. 
This section ends by flagging that the strict commitment to additivity can be 
relaxed in at least three respects. First, one might restrict the scope of the model 
such that reasons accrue additively in a strict subset of cases. One motivation for 
the restriction is that certain reasons may be incomparable or incommensurable. 
Hence one might restrict the scope of the additive model to cases in which reasons 
are commensurate and comparable (Snedegar 2018: 726). Second, one might drop 
the commitment to precisely weighted reasons. John Broome (2004: 37) rejects a 
picture of reasons accrual that is ‘strictly analogous to mechanical weighing’ on 
grounds that ‘it often seems inappropriate to associate a reason with anything so 
precise as a number.’ Nevertheless, Broome maintains that we can ‘retain the 
central elements of the [weighing] analogy,’ on the assumption that ‘the weight [of 
reasons] need not be anything so precise as a number’ (c.f. Berker 2007: 114). 
Third, one might maintain that the additive model applies to non-derivative reasons 
and not to derivative reasons, i.e. reasons that can be explained in terms of more 
basic reasons (Crisp 2000: 36-40; Gert 2004: 77-79; Nair 2016: 64-70). The idea 
here is to countenance non-additive cases of reasons accrual at the level of 








3. Extensional Inadequacy 
There are limits to what the additive model can represent.7 Extensional inadequacy 
charges against the additive model purport to show that there are certain features of 
the model’s target phenomenon, i.e. reasons accrual, that it fails to represent. The 
first half of this section explains some representational limits on the additive model 
and argues that these can straightforwardly be explained away. The second half 
offers a dilemma that presents a more serious extensional inadequacy problem.  
 
3.1. ‘Non-Additive’ Reasons Accrual 
The additive model holds that reasons accrue additively. Counterexamples to the 
additive model aim to show that there exist certain cases involving non-additive 
reasons accrual. These cases are designed to transgress the representational limits 
of the additive model. In particular, the model lacks the resources to accommodate 
exclusive disjunction cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just in case exactly one of two 
factors obtains. Neither can it accommodate biconditional cases in which one ought 
to 𝜙 just in case both or neither of two factors obtains (Horty 2012: 61; Nair 2016: 
59-60). Understanding these representational limits of the additive model and why 
they arise will help to contextualise the dilemma and its significance. Consider, 
(Exclusive Disjunction) A bomb will destroy all life on Earth if detonated. The 
bomb is controlled by two switches: one in London, one in Chicago. The bomb 
detonates if, and only if, the switches have opposing values (London UP and 
Chicago DOWN, or London DOWN and Chicago UP). Right now, the switches 
are both UP. Unbeknownst to each other, two villains plan to detonate the bomb 
at the stroke of midnight. One plans to use the London switch. The other plans 
to use the Chicago switch. Both switches are heavily guarded. We ought to 
panic if London villain makes it past the guards, or if Chicago villain makes it 
past the guards. We ought not panic if both or neither makes it past the guards.  
Here there are two factors: London villain makes it past the guards (𝑥1) and 
Chicago villain makes it past the guards (𝑥2). The additive model cannot explain 
how we ought to panic if, and only if, 𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥2 = −1, or 𝑥1 = −1 and 𝑥2 =
 
7 Here the focus is on cases of reasons accrual that the additive model cannot represent. 
There are also certain purported normative phenomena that the additive model cannot 
represent. For example, moral dilemmas in which one ought both to 𝜙 and ¬𝜙; and 
supererogation, i.e. cases in which the morally best option is not morally required. Tucker 
(forthcoming) defends a ‘dual scale’ weighing model which addresses these shortcomings. 
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1. There exist no weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 that can be applied to the factors 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 
such that 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 ≥ 0 if, and only if, 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2. For suppose that there exist 
𝑤1, 𝑤2 such that: (i) 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 < 0; (ii) 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 ≥ 0; (iii) −𝑤1 + 𝑤2 ≥ 0; (iv) 
−𝑤1 − 𝑤2 < 0. Add (i) and (iv): 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 − 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 < 0. Hence 0 < 0. ∎ 
Because this proof strategy features heavily in the paper, it is worth taking the 
time to explain how the above proof works in plain English. The additive model 
accommodates exclusive disjunction cases only if there exists a set of weights that 
gives a weighted sum of factors that comes out positive just in case exactly one of 
the two factors obtains. Conditions (i) through (iv) are the conditions that must be 
satisfied by the two weights in order for it to be true that 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 ≥ 0 if, and 
only if, 𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥2 = −1, or 𝑥1 = −1 and 𝑥2 = 1. To illustrate: Condition (i) 
concerns the situation in which both factors obtain, i.e. 𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥2 = 1. Here 
the weighted sum needs to come out negative because in an exclusive disjunction 
case one ought not 𝜙 if both factors obtain. In formal terms, then, we need it to be 
the case that (1 × 𝑤1) + (1 × 𝑤2) < 0. This simplifies to 𝑤1 + 𝑤1 < 0. The same 
idea holds for the other conditions. For example, (ii) concerns the situation where 
𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥2 = −1. Here the sum needs to come out positive, as one ought to 𝜙 
in an exclusive disjunction case if exactly one factor obtains. Hence (1 × 𝑤1) +
(−1 × 𝑤2) ≥ 0. This simplifies to 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 ≥ 0. The proof strategy above is to 
show that the conditions that the weights must satisfy in order to represent an 
exclusive disjunction case are inconsistent. The conditions, if satisfied, imply a 
contradiction. Hence no weights exist which satisfy the four conditions, and the 
additive model is unable to accommodate exclusive disjunction cases. 
The same problem arises for biconditionals. Take John Horty’s example: 
(Biconditional) ‘Suppose I am deliberating about an afternoon run, and that 
both heat and rain, taken individually, function as reasons to not run; still, the 
combination of heat and rain together might function as a weaker reason to not 
run (say, because the heat is less onerous when there is rain).’ (Horty 2012: 61; 
see also Prakken 2005: 87-8; Nair 2016: 59-60). 
There are two factors: It is hot (𝑥1) and it is raining (𝑥2). The additive model 
cannot explain how one ought to run if, and only if, 𝑥1 = 1 and 𝑥2 = 1, or 𝑥1 =
−1 and 𝑥2 = −1. There exist no weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 that can be applied to 𝑥1 and 
𝑥2 such that 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 ≥ 0 if, and only if, 𝑥1 = 𝑥2. For suppose there exist 
𝑤1, 𝑤2 such that: (i) 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 ≥ 0; (ii) 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 < 0; (iii) −𝑤1 + 𝑤2 < 0; (iv) 
−𝑤1 − 𝑤2 ≥ 0. Add (ii) and (iii): 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 < 0. Hence 0 < 0. ∎ 
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The additive model cannot represent these cases because the Boolean functions 
XOR and XNOR, which correspond to the exclusive disjunction and biconditional, 
are not linearly separable.8 Figure 1 illustrates. The white dots in each diagram 
represent the situations in which the agent ought to 𝜙. The black dots represent the 
situations in which agent ought not 𝜙. The additive model works by separating the 
‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ situations with a straight line. The equation for the line is 
𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 = 0.
9 The ‘ought’ situations are such that 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 ≥ 0, and the 
‘ought not’ situations are such that 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 < 0. The separating line runs 
through the origin and is orthogonal to the weight vector, which is shown as 𝐰 =
(1,1). The problem is that XOR and XNOR are such that no straight line can 
separate the ‘ought’ situations and the ‘ought not’ situations. Accordingly, there are 
no weights 𝐰 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2) that deliver a separating line such that one ought to 𝜙 
just in case both or neither factor obtains, or just in case one or the other obtains. 
 
Figure 1: Biconditional (LHS) and Exclusive Disjunction (RHS) 
The point can be put differently: What is being presented in the diagrams is a 
geometric representation of the factor space. The 𝑥-axis denotes the value of 𝑥1 
and the 𝑦-axis denotes the value of 𝑥2. Because factors take the either values 1 or 
−1, we are interested in the corners of the square, i.e. the four logically possible 
factor combinations, (1,1), (1, −1), (−1,1), and (−1, −1). What we are looking 
for is a pair of weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 that give a line 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 = 0, such that the 
 
8 This is a well-known problem in machine learning (Minsky and Papert 1969; Hertz, 
Krogh and Palmer 1991: 94-97). A Boolean function 𝑓 is linearly separable if, and only if, 
∃𝑤1, … , 𝑤𝑛, 𝑡 ∈ ℝ: 𝑓(𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛) = 1 ↔ Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 ≥ 𝑡 (Crama and Hammer 2011: 404). 
9 In cases involving 𝑛 factors, the 2𝑛 possible situations form the vertices an 𝑛-dimensional 
hypercube around the origin. The hypercube is separated into ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ 
situations by the hyperplane Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 0. The separating hyperplane is orthogonal to the 
weight vector because Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 𝐰 ∙ 𝐱 = ‖𝐰‖‖𝐱‖cos (𝜃). Here 𝐰 ∙ 𝐱 is the dot product of 
𝐰 = (𝑤1 , 𝑤2) and 𝐱 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2), 𝜃 is the angle between the two vectors, and ‖𝐰‖ and ‖𝐱‖ 
are the lengths of the vectors. Hence 𝜃 = 90° when Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 = 0 because arccos(0) = 90°.  
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cases in which one ought to 𝜙 fall on one side of the line, and the cases in which 
one ought not 𝜙 fall on the other side of the line. Whatever our choice of weights, 
the line will be orthogonal to the weight vector 𝐰 = (𝑤1, 𝑤2), and will intersect 
the midpoint (0,0). In exclusive disjunction and biconditional cases, there is no 
line which can be drawn through the factor space, such that the cases in which one 
ought to 𝜙 fall on one side of the line, and the cases in which one ought not 𝜙 fall 
on the other side of the line. So, trivially, there are no weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 that allow 
for additive representation of these cases. Hence the additive model of reasons is 
unable to accommodate exclusive disjunction and biconditional cases.  
These cases are not fatal to the additive model. Biconditional and exclusive 
disjunction cases can in principle be explained away either on grounds that the 
reasons in the relevant cases are misconstrued, or by appeal to the distinction 
between ultimate and derivative reasons (Crisp 2000: 36-40; Gert 2004: 77-79; 
Nair 2016: 64-70). For example, additivists can argue that each villain making it 
past the guards is not that in virtue of which one has reason to panic. Rather, the 
ground of the reason for panicking is the fact that the bomb will detonate. Hence 
the stipulated reasons are incorrect and these examples are illegitimate cases of 
non-additive reasons accrual. The other option is to concede that each villain 
making it past the guards grounds a reason for panicking, but to argue that these 
reasons are merely derivative reasons. The ultimate reason to panic is grounded in 
the fact that we are all going to die. Additivists can then concede that whilst the 
exclusive disjunction case is an instance of non-additive reasons accrual, the 
reasons that accrue are non-ultimate, and the additive model applies only to 
ultimate reasons. Neither move is obviously ad hoc. Thus the representational 
limits of the additive model so characterised are not obviously problematic. 
 
3.2. The Dilemma 
This section articulates a more serious extensional inadequacy charge against the 
additive model. The exclusive disjunction and biconditional cases purport to show 
that there exist certain non-additive cases of reasons accrual. Additivists can say in 
response that the reasons in the relevant cases are misidentified, or that the reasons 
in the cases are derivative and the additive model applies only to ultimate reasons. 
These responses are inadmissible against the extensional inadequacy charge raised 
here. What is shown is a formal constraint on the additive model’s representational 
capabilities and not a series of cases. Furthermore, the problem is not that there are 
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apparent cases of non-additive reasons accrual that the additive model is unable to 
represent. Rather, the problem is that there exist certain additive cases of reasons 
accrual that the additive model is unable to represent. Consider, 
P1 There exist disjunctive cases, i.e. cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just in case 
at least one of two factors obtains; and there exist conjunctive cases, i.e. 
cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just in case both of two factors obtain.10  
P2 The additive model accommodates disjunctive cases if, and only if, it fails 
to accommodate conjunctive cases. 
C Therefore, there exist cases that the additive model fails to accommodate. 
Take each premise in turn. First, P1. There exist conjunctive and disjunctive 
cases of reasons accrual. On one hand, conjunctive cases are cases in which two 
reasons are individually insufficient for 𝜙ing but where the reasons together are 
sufficient for 𝜙ing. These cases form a non-trivial component of what the additive 
model is intended to explain. Shyam Nair (2016: 57-8), for example, claims that 
theories of how reasons accrue purport to explain how ‘[two] reasons together […] 
can have a strength that is an increasing function of the strengths of the individual 
reasons.’ What constitutes conjunctive cases are two reasons that have a combined 
weight that is sufficient for 𝜙, but whose individual weights are insufficient for 𝜙. 
On the other hand, disjunctive cases are such that two reasons are individually and 
jointly sufficient for 𝜙. These are cases in which reasons accrue but only trivially 
so. Each reason alone is sufficient for 𝜙ing. Prima facie, both kinds of cases form 
non-trivial components of the explanandum of the additive model of reasons.  
 
10 It is important to distinguish three readings of conjunctive/disjunctive cases. On the strict 
reading, a conjunctive/disjunctive case involves exactly two factors, and one ought to 𝜙 just 
in case both/at least one of those factors obtains. On a moderately permissive reading, a 
conjunctive/disjunctive case can involve more than two factors, which are split between 
background factors 𝑥1, … , 𝑥𝑛−1, and foreground factors, 𝑥𝑛−1 and 𝑥𝑛. On this reading, a 
case is conjunctive/disjunctive provided (i) all else is equal between the background factors, 
i.e. the background considerations are exactly balanced; and (ii) holding fixed (i), one ought 
to 𝜙 just in case both/at least one of 𝑥𝑛−1 and 𝑥𝑛 obtains. Last, on a maximally permissive 
reading of conjunctive/disjunctive cases, same as before, except it does not matter whether 
the background considerations are equally balanced, i.e. there exist two factors 𝑥𝑛−1 and 𝑥𝑛 
such that whatever the balance of 𝑥1 through 𝑥𝑛−2, holding fixed the background factors, 
one ought to 𝜙 just in case both/at least one of 𝑥𝑛−1 and 𝑥𝑛 obtains. P2 holds for both the 
strict reading and the moderately permissive reading of conjunctive and disjunctive cases. It 
is not intended to hold for the maximally permissive reading. The salient upshot of this 
clarification is that it does not matter if background considerations are implicit in the 
examples provided to motivate P1, so long as all else is equal between the background 
considerations. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing for clarity on this point.  
10 
 
There is more to be said in support of P1. In particular, we can distinguish two 
kinds of argument for P1. The first is to appeal to cases. If there exist plausible 
examples of conjunctive and disjunctive cases, then there is good reason to believe 
that there exist conjunctive and disjunctive cases. Obviously, appeal to cases has 
limited dialectical force. There is always room to quibble. For example, it might be 
argued that the reasons in a particular case are misdescribed, or that the reasons 
described are derivative and not ultimate. Hence whilst cases may provide prima 
facie support for P1, the case for P1 should not rest entirely on cases. On the other 
hand, a stronger kind of argument for P1 seeks to establish a non-trivial dialectical 
cost to giving up either conjunctive or disjunctive cases.  The idea is to show that 
denying the existence of conjunctive or disjunctive cases is in some significant 
respect unattractive for additivists. For example, by showing that the denial of 
either kind of case incurs a difficult explanatory burden. What is at issue here is 
pitching P1 against the negation of P1, and showing that the negation of P1 is 
independently implausible or at least not straightforward to defend. It is clear that 
neither kind of argument decisively establishes P1. Obviously, however, insisting 
that a premise is decisively established is to impose an evidential standard that 
exceeds what might reasonably be expected in meta-normative theorising. So, the 
arguments for P1 that follow are intended to provide good reason to believe P1, but 
there is no expectation that the arguments will prove universally compelling.  
First, some cases. For the moment bracket the question of whether the reasons 
in these cases are ultimate or derivative. What is minimally clear is that conjunctive 
and disjunctive cases are ubiquitous if we are unconcerned about the distinction 
between ultimate and derivative reasons. Furthermore, unlike biconditional and 
exclusive disjunction cases, these cases are straightforward to construct and are not 
in the relevant sense contrived. For example, here are two epistemic cases: 
(Conjunction) You are meeting a secret agent for lunch in a pub. You do not 
know what she looks like, but you have been informed that she will be wearing 
a grey trenchcoat and have a Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament badge affixed 
to her lapel. You arrive early. There is a lady in the corner. You ought to believe 
that she is the agent just in case she has a grey trenchcoat and a CND badge on 
her lapel. Neither of the reasons is sufficiently weighty for you to believe that 
the lady is the agent. But together both reasons are sufficiently weighty.  
(Disjunction) Your teenage son is pretty cool. One day he comes home from a 
party. You ought to believe that he smoked marijuana at the party if he smells 
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strongly of marijuana, or if he is visibly high, or both. These two reasons are 
individually and jointly sufficient for believing that he smoked marijuana. 
Epistemic normativity offers particularly clear examples of conjunctive and 
disjunctive cases. Conjunctive and disjunctive cases are also apparently ubiquitous 
in practical rationality. Here are two practical examples. Consider,  
(Conjunction) You want to buy a plant that requires infrequent watering and 
that flowers in the summer. Your friend suggests a particular plant. You ought 
to get the plant just in case it requires infrequent watering and it flowers in the 
summer. These reasons are individually insufficient but together sufficient.    
(Disjunction) You have bought every item on your shopping list besides baked 
beans and a purple scarf. You walk past a shop. You ought to go into the shop if 
they sell baked beans, purple scarves, or both. Either reason is sufficient for you 
to go into the shop; and both reasons together are also sufficient.  
There are, at least, two respects in which these cases can be challenged. First, it 
can be argued that these cases are not genuine conjunctive and disjunctive cases 
because there are certain background reasons at play that have not been described. 
However, P2 holds both for cases involving exactly two factors, and cases in which 
there are background considerations at play but those considerations are balanced. 
Accordingly, so long as all else is equal amongst the background considerations, 
the argument goes through; and here there is no obvious reason to suppose that the 
background considerations tilt the scales in favour of or against 𝜙ing. Second, it 
can be argued that the reasons at issue in these cases are not ultimate reasons, and 
that the dialectical burden is to provide examples of conjunctive and disjunctive 
cases at the level of ultimate reasons. This move is impossible to block absent a list 
of ultimate reasons. Without such a list, it is always an option for additivists to 
deny that the reasons described are ultimate. What can be done, however, is to 
provide examples of conjunctive and disjunctive cases that involve reasons that are 
typically taken to be ultimate reasons. This move is not decisive, as the reasons at 
issue may turn out not to be ultimate reasons. But it is the best that can be done in 
terms of providing examples. Consider the following pair of moral cases: 
(Conjunction) You are a witness in court. You are asked to affirm or deny that 
you saw the Defendant plotting against the state authorities. The fact that you 
saw the Defendant plotting, i.e. the affirmation would be honest, is an 
insufficient reason for you to make the affirmation. For it might be the case that 
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the state is illegitimate and the Defendant had good cause for plotting against 
the state, i.e. making the affirmation would be unjust. Likewise, the fact that the 
affirmation would be just, i.e. the state is legitimate, is insufficient to make the 
affirmation. For it might be that you did not see the Defendant plotting against 
the state, in which case it would be dishonest to make the affirmation. Honesty 
and justice are individually insufficient but jointly sufficient reasons to affirm.  
(Disjunction) You promised Grandma that you would give money to the 
homeless should you have ample means. You have ample means, and you pass 
a homeless person in need of money. Here there are two reasons to give money 
to the homeless person: You promised Grandma and it is the kind thing to do. 
Either reason is sufficient to give money, and both are together sufficient.11  
These cases are unlikely to convince everyone. But in lieu of a list of ultimate 
reasons, there is not much more that can be done in the way of providing examples. 
Furthermore, given the general lack of agreement about what is and what is not an 
ultimate reason, it is futile to pretend that cases will receive unanimous acceptance. 
For that reason these cases are intended only to provide prima facie support to P1. 
The second argument for P1 is to pitch P1 against its negation, and argue that 
the negation of P1 is a theoretically costly commitment for additivists. Consider the 
costs of rejecting disjunctive and conjunctive cases in turn. First, disjunctive cases. 
Recall that disjunctive cases are cases in which reasons accrue but only trivially. 
Two reasons are individually and jointly sufficient for 𝜙. Denying that these cases 
exist implies that no two reasons which are individually sufficient for 𝜙 can co-
occur for any act 𝜙. Minimally, this commitment requires an error theory for 
apparent cases of trivial reasons accrual. But what is also required is a plausible 
metaphysical account of the mechanism which prohibits the co-occurrence. For 
example, it might be argued that no two reasons which are individually sufficient 
for 𝜙 can co-occur because there is a strict priority ordering over factors such that 
the obtaining of a dominant factor disables dominated factors from grounding 
reasons to 𝜙. This claim, if true, would explain why no cases exist in which two 
reasons which are sufficient for 𝜙ing can co-occur. Obviously, however, this 
explanation and relevantly similar explanations are unavailable to additivists as 
they imply that reasons are non-separable, i.e. explanations of this sort require the 
grounds of some reasons to act as disabling conditions on other reasons. So, it is at 
 
11 This case is loosely based on Zoë Johnson King’s (2020: 190-91) promise keeping case, 
although Johnson King’s case concerns motivating reasons.  
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best unclear what mechanism is available to additivists which, first, guarantees that 
no two individually sufficient reasons can co-occur, whilst at the same time 
preserves the commitment to the claim that reasons are separable, where this latter 
claim is a precondition on additive representation of reasons accrual. Accordingly, 
giving up on disjunctive cases incurs a significant theoretical cost. Hence rejecting 
P1 on grounds that disjunctive cases do not exist is prima facie unattractive. 
On the other hand, giving up conjunctive cases neuters the abductive support for 
the additive model. Recall that the abductive case for the additive model depends in 
large part on its simplicity. Now, conjunctive cases are such that two reasons are 
individually insufficient but together sufficient for 𝜙ing. If there are no such cases, 
then, prima facie, reasons accrual consists only in trivial cases of accrual, i.e. cases 
in which two reasons are individually and together sufficient for 𝜙ing. But if this is 
all that the target phenomenon consists in, then the additive model is one of several 
models that adequately captures the target phenomenon. An equally plausible 
model is one on which one ought to 𝜙 if there exists a sufficient reason for 𝜙ing. 
Insisting that the weights of reasons must be combined to determine the deontic 
status of acts, as the additive model does, introduces needless complexity into the 
picture if the only cases of reasons accrual are trivial cases. The target phenomenon 
is adequately captured by simpler models which do not require combining weights. 
Hence in denying conjunctive cases, i.e. cases of non-trivial reasons accrual, 
additivists are restricting the phenomenon to be explained to such an extent that 
their model is no longer the simplest explanation of the target phenomenon. Thus, 
the risk in denying the existence of conjunctive cases is that additivists undermine 
the abductive support for their model over rival models of how reasons accrue.  
That concludes the case for P1. This case is not decisive. But what should be 
clear, minimally, is that there is prima facie evidence in the form of cases to accept 
P1, and that the dialectical costs of denying P1 are significant. This provides good 
reason to take P1 seriously, even if the case for its acceptance is not decisive.  
P2. This premise is a theorem. Recall that the additive model can be formulated 
either as having a strict or a weak threshold. The strict threshold is such that one 
ought to 𝜙 just in case the reasons for 𝜙ing strictly outweigh the reasons against. 
The weak threshold is such that one ought to 𝜙 just in case the reasons for 𝜙ing are 
at least as weighty as the reasons against. The theorem holds that the additive 
model accommodates conjunctive cases only if the strict threshold is used; and it 
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accommodates disjunctive cases only if the weak threshold is used. The additive 
model accommodates conjunctive or disjunctive cases but not both kinds of case. 
Proof: First, disjunctive cases. The model can represent disjunctive cases on the 
weak threshold. Provided 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 > 0, the model gives the correct result. For 
example, let 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 = 1. Then: (i) 1 + 1 ≥ 0; (ii) 1 − 1 ≥ 0; (iii) −1 + 1 ≥ 0; 
and (iv) −1 − 1 ≱ 0, as required. The model fails to represent disjunctive cases on 
the strict threshold. There exists no pair of weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 such that 𝑤1𝑥1 +
𝑤2𝑥2 > 0 if, and only if, ¬(𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = −1). For suppose there exist 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 
such that: (i) 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 > 0; (ii) 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 > 0; (iii) −𝑤1 + 𝑤2 > 0; (iv) −𝑤1 −
𝑤2 ≤ 0. Sum (ii) and (iii): 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 > 0. Hence 0 > 0. Contradiction. 
Second, conjunctive cases. The model can represent conjunctive cases on the strict 
threshold provided 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 > 0, e.g. let 𝑤1 = 𝑤2 = 1. Then: (i) 1 + 1 > 0; (ii) 
1 − 1 ≯ 0; (iii) −1 + 1 ≯ 0; and (iv) −1 − 1 ≯ 0, as required. The model fails to 
represent conjunctive cases on the weak threshold. There exist no weights 𝑤1 and 
𝑤2 such that 𝑤1𝑥1 + 𝑤2𝑥2 ≥ 0 if, and only if, 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 1. For suppose there 
exist 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 such that: (i) 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 ≥ 0; (ii) 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 < 0; (iii) −𝑤1 + 𝑤2 < 0; 
(iv) −𝑤1 − 𝑤2 < 0. Sum (ii) and (iii): 𝑤1 − 𝑤2 − 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 < 0. Hence 0 < 0. ∎  
That concludes the defence of the premises. The argument is valid. Hence the 
conclusion follows. Either the additive model fails to accommodate conjunctive 
cases or it fails to accommodate disjunctive cases. Both kinds of cases exist. So, 
there are certain cases that the additive model fails to accommodate.  
 
Figure 2: Conjunction (LHS) and Disjunction (RHS) 
The dilemma arises because the reasons in conjunctive and disjunctive cases are 
identical. Two factors have positive and equal weight. Accordingly, in situations 
such that one factor obtains and the other does not, two equally weighted reasons 
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pull in opposing directions. What breaks the tie is the threshold. On the weak 
threshold, one ought to 𝜙. On the strict threshold, one ought not 𝜙. In formal 
terms, because the two factors in conjunctive and disjunctive cases have positive 
equal weight, the separating line which divides the ‘ought’ and the ‘ought not’ 
situations is the same. This line runs through both situations such that 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2. If 
the threshold is weak, situations (−1,1) and (1, −1) fall on the ‘ought’ side of the 
line, i.e. the case is treated as disjunctive. If the threshold is strict, the situations 
(−1,1) and (1, −1) fall on the ‘ought not’ side of the line, i.e. the case is treated as 
conjunctive. Figure 2 illustrates. What this implies is that the additive model can 
either accommodate cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just in case at least one of two 
factors obtains; or the model can accommodate cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just 
in case both of two factors obtains. Because both sorts of cases are legitimate, the 
additive model is extensionally inadequate. There are cases it cannot accommodate. 
 
4. Modifications  
This section examines whether the additive model can be modified to avoid the 
dilemma. Four modifications are considered. (1) Maintain that the strict threshold 
applies in conjunctive cases and the weak threshold applies in disjunctive cases. (2) 
Introduce a bias term into the summation of reasons that stacks the additive model 
in favour of or against an act’s performance. (3) Drop the commitment to reasons 
having precise weights. (4) Maintain that a factor’s non-obtaining has reason-
giving weight of zero as opposed to a weight equal to the negative weight of the 
reason grounded in the factor when it obtains. It is argued that each option fails. 
 
4.1. Variable Threshold 
The first option is to maintain that the combinatorial function, though additive in 
all cases, employs a weak threshold for disjunctive cases and a strict threshold for 
conjunctive cases. In disjunctive cases one ought to 𝜙 just in case the reasons for 
𝜙ing are at least as weighty as the reasons against; and in conjunctive cases one 
ought to 𝜙 just in case the reasons for 𝜙ing are strictly weightier than the reasons 
against. This move in principle provides a straightforward solution to the dilemma. 
The variable threshold is costly. First, introducing a variable threshold renders 
the additive model inconsistent with comparativism, i.e. the thesis that the deontic 
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status of acts is solely determined by the comparative strength of the reasons for 
and against those acts (Chang 2016: 215; see also Tucker forthcoming). This is for 
two reasons. First, whatever determines the appropriate threshold in a particular 
case is a partial determinant of deontic status. Consider an act 𝜙, the deontic status 
of which is determined by two factors that have positive and equal weight. If one 
factor obtains and the other does not, then one ought not 𝜙 on the strict threshold 
and one ought to 𝜙 on the weak threshold. Hence what determines the correct 
threshold is a partial determinant of deontic status. Second, whatever it is that 
determines the appropriate threshold is not the weights of the reasons. This is 
because the comparative weight of the reasons in conjunctive and disjunctive cases 
is the same, i.e. the two factors have positive equal weight. The determinant of the 
threshold must therefore be something other than comparative weight of reasons. 
Rejecting comparativism is not itself a theoretical cost. The cost is incurred via 
the explanatory burden involved in making a non-comparativist theory of additive 
reasons accrual that overcomes the extensional inadequacy charge. Extensional 
adequacy requires that the strict threshold applies in conjunctive cases and the 
weak threshold applies in disjunctive cases. What is needed is an explanation for 
why the strict threshold applies in conjunctive cases and the weak threshold applies 
in disjunctive cases. What determines whether a case is conjunctive or disjunctive 
is facts about the deontic status of the relevant act in different situations. Hence one 
cannot claim that the strict threshold applies in a given case because that case is a 
conjunctive case. For then facts about an act’s deontic status would determine the 
appropriate threshold, and the threshold would in turn determine facts about the 
act’s deontic status. What is unclear is how we can distinguish between conjunctive 
and disjunctive cases as to ensure that the weak threshold applies in the latter cases 
and the strict threshold applies in the former cases. This cannot be done by appeal 
to the status of the cases as conjunctive or disjunctive on pain of circularity. 
There are two options. The first is to suppose that there is a priority ordering 
over reasons grounded in different features. When two equally weighted reasons 
pull in opposing directions, the priority ordering determines whether one ought to 
𝜙 or ¬𝜙. The priority ordering is a tie-breaker. If the reason for 𝜙ing ranks higher 
than the reason for ¬𝜙ing, then the weak threshold applies and the case is treated 
as a disjunctive case. In contrast, if the reason for ¬𝜙ing ranks higher than the 
reason for 𝜙ing, then the strict threshold applies and the case is treated as a 
conjunctive case. This option allows additivists to distinguish conjunctive and 
disjunctive cases without appeal to the cases qua conjunctive or disjunctive cases, 
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and consequently avoids the circularity charge outlined above. The explanatory 
burden is manageable. What is needed is a specification of the priority ordering. 
The variable threshold model cannot obviously be made to work by appeal to a 
priority ordering over reason-giving features. The problem is that there exist pairs 
of cases that involve identical reason-giving features, but where one of the cases is 
conjunctive and the other is disjunctive. Consider the following examples: 
Case 1: You are a witness in court. You are asked to affirm or deny that you 
saw Defendants 1 and 2 enter the bank prior to the robbery. You ought to affirm 
just in case you saw Defendant 1 and Defendant 2 enter the bank. 
Case 2: You are a witness in court. You are asked to affirm or deny that you 
saw either Defendant 1 or 2 enter the bank prior to the robbery. You ought to 
affirm just in case you saw at least one of Defendants 1 and 2 enter the bank.  
These cases involve two reason-giving features: You saw Defendant 1 enter the 
bank and you saw Defendant 2 enter the bank. In one case, you ought to 𝜙 just in 
case both factors obtain. In the other case, you ought to 𝜙 just in case at least one 
of the factors obtains. Accordingly, there exist both conjunctive and disjunctive 
cases that involve the same reason-giving features. Thus it cannot be the case that a 
priority ordering over the reason-giving features determines whether the weak or 
the strict threshold applies. For the threshold in one of these cases is weak and in 
the other it is strict even though the two reason-giving features are identical.  
It can be objected that these cases concern derivative reasons and not ultimate 
reasons, and that the scope of the additive model is restricted to ultimate reasons 
(Crisp 2000: 36-40; Nair 2016: 64-70). Perhaps the ultimate reason that bears on 
making or not making the truthful affirmation is that doing so is honest. This move 
has some purchase, at least in the moral case. Furthermore, it is hard to block the 
move absent a list of reason-giving properties that are said to be ultimate and their 
priority ranking. We can, however, speculate about what might be ultimate reasons. 
Crisp (2000: 37-8) claims that honesty and justice are ultimate reasons. Assume he 
is correct. Recall the following conjunctive case from Section 3.2: 
Case 3: You are a witness in court. You are asked to affirm or deny that you 
saw the Defendant plotting against the state authorities. The fact that you saw 
the Defendant plotting, i.e. the affirmation would be honest, is an insufficient 
reason for you to make the affirmation. For it might be the case that the state is 
illegitimate and the Defendant had good cause for plotting against the state, i.e. 
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making the affirmation would be unjust. Likewise, the fact that the affirmation 
would be just, i.e. the state is legitimate, is insufficient to make the affirmation. 
For it might be that you did not see the Defendant plotting against the state, in 
which case it would be dishonest to make the affirmation. Honesty and justice 
are individually insufficient but jointly sufficient reasons to affirm.  
Here is a disjunctive case involving the same morally relevant factors: 
Case 4: You and your friend have the same name. There is a mix-up at the 
Examinations Office. You receive your friend’s grade and your friend receives 
your grade. Your friend’s true mark is very high, and your true mark is very 
low. Your friend is bitterly disappointed with the low mark, whereas you are 
delighted with the high mark. The next day, by chance, you sit next to the Chief 
Examiner on the bus. You get talking, and he, being a chatterbox, discloses that 
there has been a mix-up involving two students with the same name. You and 
your friend are the only students in the class with the same name, so you know 
that the mix-up concerns you and your friend. The Chief Examiner tells you that 
he has no intention of fixing the mix-up because he fears that he will be fired as 
Chief Examiner if he admits the mistake. That evening, you are at your friend’s 
house. They are in tears: ‘How could this possibly have happened?,’ they sob, ‘I 
revised so much for that exam.’ You can either inform your friend that you 
know about the mix-up or you can say nothing. Presumably, the reasons to 
inform your friend are overdetermined. It would be the just thing to do, and the 
honest thing to do. Both reasons are individually and jointly sufficient.  
Cases like these are only so convincing. There is always room to quibble. But 
the dialectical burden here is on additivists to rule-out such cases in order to make 
a plausible case for a priority-ranking over reason giving features. What is needed 
is a general explanation for why there exist no two reason-giving features such that 
in some cases one ought to 𝜙 just in case both features obtain, and in other cases 
one ought to 𝜙 just in case at least one of the two features obtains. Furthermore, a 
general error theory is required for why apparent cases in which the same two 
reasons appear to feature in conjunctive and disjunctive cases are merely illusory. 
Explaining away counterexamples on an ad hoc basis is unsatisfactory. For the 
burden of proof is on additivists to show that the priority ordering renders their 
position extensionally adequate. The burden is not on opponents of additivity to 
establish that the modification is extensionally inadequate. Accordingly, whilst the 
counterexamples provided for both derivative and ultimate reasons do not rule out 
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the priority ranking strategy decisively, what has minimally been shown is that the 
use of priority ranking to underpin a variable threshold is theoretically costly. 
There is a second option for making the variable threshold work. This is to say 
that what determines the appropriate threshold in a given situation is judgement. 
What role judgement is required to play here must be carefully theorised. For 
additivists cannot follow W.D. Ross (1930) in assigning an ineliminable role for 
judgement in the balancing of reasons on grounds that there exist no general 
principles that explain how reasons trade-off to determine deontic status (c.f. 
Berker 2007: 110; Audi 1996: 106; McNaughton 1996: 445-7). The Rossian 
position is comparativist. Reasons determine deontic status. Judgement is required 
only to discern which act is favoured on the balance of reasons absent general 
principles. Disjunctive and conjunctive cases involve two factors with positive 
equal weight. In situations where one factor obtains and the other does not, two 
reasons with equal weight pull in opposing directions. Judgement cannot be used to 
discern the stronger of the two reasons because the reasons are exactly balanced. 
Instead, what is required is that judgement resolves conflicts between conflicting 
and equally weighted reasons (c.f. Gaut 1993: 36; Nagel 1979). Here the role for 
judgement is as a determinant of deontic status, not as a discriminant. Judgement is 
a tie-breaker for determining deontic status when reasons are exactly balanced.  
Treating judgement as a determinant as opposed to a discriminant of deontic 
status is theoretically costly. This view of judgement admits a Euthyphro problem. 
Suppose we are in a situation in which two factors with positive equal weight are 
such that one factor obtains and the other does not. Then whether we ought to 𝜙 
depends on judgement. In particular, the case can either be treated as a disjunctive 
case such that we ought to 𝜙; or as a conjunctive case such that we ought not 𝜙. 
Either our judgement about the deontic status of 𝜙 is principled or unprincipled. If 
principled, then there exist principles by which the judgement can be evaluated. 
What is then unclear is why judgement is required to determine deontic status. For 
it seems that the additive model can be combined with the judgement evaluation 
principle to yield a non-comparativist account of how reasons accrue that provides 
a determinate verdict in all cases. This renders judgement eliminable, and an 
account is required as to what the relevant principle is. On the other hand, if the 
judgement is unprincipled, then the deontic status of 𝜙 is arbitrary. Admitting 
arbitrariness in deontic status seriously diminishes the theoretical standing of the 
additive model. This cost is unacceptably high absent an error theory for the 




4.2. Biased Model 
The second option is to introduce a bias into the model. A bias is an extra term in 
the summation that stacks the model in favour of a particular deontic status. Call 
this term 𝑏. Then one ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏 > 0 (strict threshold); 
or one ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, Σ𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑏 ≥ 0 (weak threshold). A negative bias 
makes it the case that one ought to 𝜙 just in case the weighted sum of reasons is at 
least |𝑏| (weak) or strictly greater than |𝑏| (strict). The effect is to bias the model 
against the performance of 𝜙. A positive bias makes it the case that one ought to 𝜙 
just in case the weighted sum of reasons is at least equal to −𝑏 (weak) or strictly 
greater than −𝑏 (strict). The effect is to bias the model in favour of 𝜙ing. In both 
cases, the bias shifts the separating line away from the origin. This ensures that the 
separating line does not intersect the problematic situations in which 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2. 
 
Figure 3: Disjunctive Case (LHS) and Conjunctive Case (RHS) 
Introducing a bias term is not free. One abductive virtue of the additive model is 
that it gives a plausible metaphysical basis for the phenomenology of deliberation. 
In particular, it provides a rationale for why it appears to us that what we ought to 
do depends on the balance of reasons that pull in conflicting directions. Whereas 
the reasons for and against 𝜙ing postulated by the additive model track features of 
the phenomenology of deliberation, there is no obvious feature of deliberation that 
the bias term refers to. Hence introducing the bias term burdens the additive model 
with a one reason too many problem. The bias is, in effect, a reason for or against 
𝜙ing over and above the ordinary reasons for or against 𝜙ing. Introducing a bias 
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term thus diminishes the abductive standing of the additive model.12 What is 
needed is an account of what the bias term is and an explanation for how the bias 
term is a partial determinant of deontic status despite not obviously featuring in 
deliberation.  
We can nevertheless grant the plausibility of the bias term for argument’s sake. 
The biased model can represent conjunctive cases with either the weak or the strict 
threshold. However, it requires a negative bias to do so. In contrast, the biased 
model can represent disjunctive cases with either the weak or the strict threshold. 
But it requires a positive bias to do so. Hence there is no unique bias 𝑏 that enables 
the model to accommodate conjunctive and disjunctive cases simultaneously. A 
different bias will have to apply in conjunctive and disjunctive cases. Accordingly, 
similar problems emerge for the bias term and the variable threshold model. First, 
additivists cannot on pain of circularity claim that the status of cases as conjunctive 
or disjunctive determines the appropriate bias. For what makes a case conjunctive 
or disjunctive is facts about deontic status in different situations. It cannot be the 
case that facts about deontic status determine facts about what kind of case is at 
issue which in turn determine the appropriate threshold which in turn determines 
deontic status. That is circular. Hence additivists will have to appeal to either a 
priority ordering over the features or individual judgement to determine the 
appropriate bias in particular cases, and the same problems arise as before.  
  
4.3. Imprecise Reasons 
The third modification is to drop the additive model’s commitment to the idea that 
reasons have numerically representable weights. What motivates this move is the 
following objection: The dilemma concerns situations in which two precisely 
comparable reasons are exactly balanced in favour of two alternatives. However, 
additivists are free to deny that the additive model’s use of precisely weighted 
reasons is a substantive metaphysical commitment (Broome 2004: 37; Berker 
2007: 114). This feature of the model can be treated as an idealisation. Perhaps, 
then, the dilemma reveals a limitation of the formal model, and not a problem in 
the metaphysical commitments that undergird the model. If so, additivists can 
avoid the dilemma by dropping the commitment to precisely weighted reasons. 
 
12 See Tucker (forthcoming) for a discussion of a default bias towards permissibility in the 
context of weighing models of reasons such as the additive model. Note that ‘default’ in 
this sense differs from Horty’s (2012) account of reasons as defaults.   
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Admitting imprecise reasons into the additive model fails to avoid the dilemma. 
The dilemma arises because the factors in conjunctive and disjunctive cases are 
identically weighted. The two factors have positive equal weight. The problem is 
that in situations in which one factor or the other obtains two conflicting and 
equally weighty reasons pull in opposing directions. Accordingly, the reasons are 
balanced and thus contain insufficient information to favour 𝜙ing or ¬𝜙ing. 
Imprecise reasons cannot solve the dilemma because imprecise reasons contain less 
information than precise reasons. Because an informational deficit is the source of 
the dilemma, removing information from the model will not solve the problem. 
This point can be strengthened by showing that the dilemma resurfaces in a revised 
form of the additive model that accommodates imprecisely weighted reasons.  
Here is the imprecise model: Rather than representing the reason grounded in 
factor 𝑥𝑖 as a sharp numerical value 𝑤𝑖, instead represent the reason as an interval, 
[𝑎, 𝑏] ⊆ ℝ. The idea is that the weight of the reason is imprecise, but we can still 
give lower and upper bounds on the imprecision.13 This representational technique 
facilitates both slight imprecision and severe imprecision depending on the width 
of the intervals used. In cases involving two factors, the factors 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 ground 
imprecise reasons [𝑎1, 𝑏1] and [𝑎2, 𝑏2] respectively. These imprecisely weighted 
reasons yield a set of weight vectors given by each precisification of the weights: 
Ω = {(𝜔1, 𝜔2)| 𝜔1 ∈ [𝑎1, 𝑏1] ∧ 𝜔2 ∈ [𝑎2, 𝑏2]} 
Each 𝝎 ∈ Ω defines a separating line ℒ𝝎 such that ℒ𝝎 is orthogonal to 𝝎. Here 
ℒ𝛚 is the line 𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 = 0, where 𝝎 = (𝜔1, 𝜔2). Accordingly, in place of 
the single separating line that we find in the standard additive model, there is a set 
of separating lines, ℒΩ = {ℒ𝝎| 𝝎 ∈ Ω}. The weak and strict thresholds do not work 
in the imprecise model. There is no determinate point at which the reasons for 𝜙ing 
outweigh the reasons against. There are two plausible imprecise decision rules. 
Each is compatible with both a weak and a strict threshold. Consider, 
Restrictive Rule: One ought to 𝜙 if on any precisification of the reasons, the 
reasons for 𝜙ing outweigh the reasons against.  
Permissive Rule: One ought to 𝜙 if there exists at least one precisification of the 
reasons such that the reasons for 𝜙ing outweigh the reasons against.  
 
13 For discussion of interval representation see Chang (2005).  
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The dilemma arises for the imprecise additive model because the restrictive rule 
accommodates conjunctive and not disjunctive cases, whereas the permissive rule 
accommodates disjunctive and not conjunctive cases. Hence the imprecise model 
cannot accommodate both conjunctive and disjunctive cases. Below is the proof. 
(1) Permissive rule accommodates disjunctive cases. An example suffices. 
Let 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ground identical imprecise reasons [0.5,1]. On the permissive rule, one 
ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, ¬(𝑥1 = −1 ∧ 𝑥2 = −1). Case 1: Suppose 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 1. 
Then ∃𝝎 ∈ Ω: 𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 > 0, e.g. 𝜔1 = 𝜔2 = 1. Here 1 + 1 = 2 > 0, so one 
ought to 𝜙. Case 2: Suppose 𝑥1 = 1 ∧ 𝑥2 = −1. Then ∃𝝎 ∈ Ω: 𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 > 0, 
e.g. 𝜔1 = 1, 𝜔2 = 0.5. Here 1 − 0.5 = 0.5 > 0, so one ought to 𝜙. Case 3: Same 
as Case 2. Case 4: Suppose 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = −1. Then ∀𝝎 ∈ Ω: 𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0. The 
upper bound on −𝜔1 − 𝜔2 = −0.5 − 0.5 = −1 < 0, so one ought not 𝜙. ∎ 
(2) Permissive rule cannot accommodate conjunctive cases. Let 𝑥1 ground 
imprecise reason [𝑎, 𝑏] and 𝑥2 ground [𝑐, 𝑑]. We assume a non-degenerate case of 
imprecision such that 𝑏 > 𝑎 and 𝑑 > 𝑐. Suppose for purposes of contradiction that 
the permissive rule can accommodate conjunctive cases. Then ∀𝝎 ∈ Ω: (𝜔1𝑥2 −
𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0) ∧ (−𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0). It follows from 𝑏 > 𝑎 and 𝑑 > 𝑐 that ∃𝝎 ∈
Ω: (𝜔1 > 𝜔2) ∨ (𝜔2 > 𝜔1). First, suppose 𝜔1 > 𝜔2. If 𝜔1 − 𝜔2 ≯ 0, then 𝜔2 ≥
𝜔1. Contradiction. Second, suppose 𝜔2 > 𝜔1. If −𝜔1 + 𝜔2 ≯ 0, then 𝜔2 ≥ 𝜔1. 
Contradiction. Hence ∃𝝎 ∈ Ω: ¬((𝜔1𝑥2 − 𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0) ∧ (−𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0)). 
Hence ¬∀𝝎 ∈ Ω: (𝜔1𝑥2 − 𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0) ∧ (−𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 ≯ 0). Contradiction. ∎ 
(3) Restrictive rule accommodates conjunctive cases. An example suffices. 
Let 𝑥1, 𝑥2 ground identical imprecise reasons [0.5,1]. On the restrictive rule, one 
ought to 𝜙 if, and only if, 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 1. Case 1: Suppose that 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = 1. Here 
∀𝝎 ∈ Ω: 𝜔1 + 𝜔2 ≥ 1 > 0. This follows from the lower bound 0.5. So, one ought 
to 𝜙. Case 2: Suppose that 𝑥1 = 1 ∧ 𝑥2 = −1. Then ∃𝝎 Ω: 𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 ≤ 0, e.g. 
𝜔1 = 0.5, 𝜔2 = 1. Here 0.5 − 1 = −0.5 ≤ 0, so one ought not 𝜙. Case 3: Same as 
Case 2. Case 4: Suppose that 𝑥1 = 𝑥2 = −1. Then ∃𝝎 𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 ≤ 0, e.g. 
𝜔1 = 0.5, 𝜔2 = 1. Here 0.5 − 1 = −0.5 ≤ 0, so one ought not 𝜙. ∎ 
(4) Restrictive rule cannot accommodate disjunctive cases. Let 𝑥1 ground 
imprecise reason [𝑎, 𝑏] and 𝑥2 ground [𝑐, 𝑑]. We assume a non-degenerate case of 
imprecision such that 𝑏 > 𝑎 and 𝑑 > 𝑐. Suppose for purposes of contradiction that 
the restrictive rule can accommodate disjunctive cases. Then ∀𝝎 ∈ Ω: (𝜔1𝑥1 − 𝜔2 
𝑥2 > 0) ∧ (−𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 > 0). It follows from 𝑏 > 𝑎 and 𝑑 > 𝑐 that ∃𝝎 ∈ Ω: 
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(𝜔1 > 𝜔2) ∨ (𝜔2 > 𝜔1). First, suppose 𝜔1 > 𝜔2. If −𝜔1 + 𝜔2 > 0, then 𝜔2 >
𝜔1. Contradiction. Second, suppose 𝜔2 > 𝜔1. If 𝜔1 − 𝜔2 > 0, then 𝜔1 > 𝜔2. 
Contradiction. Hence ∃𝝎 ∈ Ω: ¬((𝜔1 − 𝜔2 > 0) ∧ (𝜔2 − 𝜔1 > 0)). It follows 
that  ¬∀𝝎 ∈ Ω: (𝜔1𝑥1 − 𝜔2 𝑥2 > 0) ∧ (−𝜔1𝑥1 + 𝜔2𝑥2 > 0). Contradiction. ∎ 
 
4.4. No Negative Weight for Non-Obtaining Factors 
The final option is to suggest that the dilemma arises because the additive model, 
as characterised, assigns each factor 𝑥𝑖 a value 1 if that factor obtains, and −1 
otherwise.14 What is being assumed here is that a factor’s non-obtaining grounds an 
equal and opposite reason to the reason grounded when that factor obtains. 
Additivists can deny this assumption, and maintain that the non-obtaining of a 
factor has no reason-giving weight for or against the act. If so, then factors 𝑥𝑖 ought 
to be assigned a value 1 if the factor obtains, and 0 otherwise. Perhaps, then, the 
dilemma can be avoided if the 0,1 formalism offers a more plausible representation 
of the additive model and the dilemma does not manifest in the 0,1 model.  
This proposal is prima facie plausible. Consider again, 
(Disjunction) You promised Grandma that you would give money to the 
homeless should you have ample means. You have ample means, and you pass 
a homeless person in need of money. Here there are two reasons to give money 
to the homeless person: You promised Grandma and it is the kind thing to do. 
Either reason is sufficient to give money, and both are together sufficient. 
Let an act’s being kind and its fulfilling a promise each have positive 10 weight 
in favour of the act’s performance. If either or both factors apply, the total reason-
giving weight in favour of the act is either 10 or 20. Given a strict threshold, one 
ought to perform the act just in case at least one of the two features obtain (as in 
either case there is strictly greater than 0 weight in favour). This shows that the 
additive model can accommodate disjunctive cases on the strict threshold under the 
assumption that a factor’s non-obtaining counts 0 weight rather than −1 weight. 
In response: This move is plausible to the extent that the 0,1 formalism has 
greater representational power than the −1,1 formalism. However, this is not so. 
The problem is that, whilst the 0,1 formalism allows disjunctive cases on the strict 
threshold, it does not allow conjunctive cases on the strict threshold. What is more, 
 
14 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pushing me to address this objection.  
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on the weak threshold, neither disjunctive nor conjunctive cases are accounted for. 
Hence the 0,1 formalism faces a relevantly analogous extensional inadequacy 
concern. The additive model, so construed, accommodates only disjunctive cases. 
Proof: (1) The strict threshold cannot represent conjunctive cases. There exists 
no pair of weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 such that: (i) 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 > 0; (ii) 𝑤1 ≤ 0; (iii) 𝑤2 ≤ 0; 
and (iv) 0 + 0 ≤ 0. Sum (ii) and (iii) to get 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 ≤ 0. This contradicts (i). (2) 
The weak threshold cannot accommodate disjunctive cases. There exists no pair of 
weights 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 such that: (i) 𝑤1 + 𝑤2 ≥ 0; (ii) 𝑤1 ≥ 0; (iii) 𝑤2 ≥ 0; (iv) 0 +
0 < 0. (iv) is a contradiction.  (3) The weak threshold cannot accommodate 
conjunctive cases. (iv) is the same for disjunctive cases. Contradiction. ∎  
 
Figure 4: The weak threshold classifies (0,0) as an ‘ought’ situation given any 
separating line, and thus cannot represent conjunctive or disjunctive cases; the 
strict threshold leaves no available separating line for conjunctive cases. 
To explain: First, consider the weak threshold. For any 𝑤1, 𝑤2, the separating 
line intersects the point (0,0). This is because (0 × 𝑤1) + (0 × 𝑤2) = 0. The weak 
threshold cannot represent conjunctive or disjunctive cases because the situation in 
which neither factor obtains, i.e. (0,0), is on the separating line. That is, the weak 
threshold classifies all situations on or above the line as ‘ought situations,’ (0,0) is 
on the line in the 0,1 model, and (0,0) is an ‘ought not situation’ for conjunctive 
and disjunctive cases. Hence neither can be represented on the weak threshold. 
Second, the strict threshold cannot represent disjunctive cases because there is no 
line that intersects the point (0,0) such that (1,1) is strictly above the line and the 
other points are on or below the line. Figure 4 gives a geometric illustration.  
To summarise, the dilemma can be avoided by adopting the 0,1 formalism as 
opposed to the −1,1 formalism. This allows for disjunctive cases to be represented 
using the strict threshold. However, the price for accommodating disjunctive cases 
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on the strict threshold is that conjunctive cases cannot be accommodated. What is 
more, on the weak threshold, neither conjunctive nor disjunctive cases can be 
accommodated. Hence adopting the 0,1 formalism does not solve the extensional 
inadequacy problem. The 0,1 model cannot accommodate conjunctive cases 
irrespective of the threshold used. Accordingly, adopting the 0,1 model amounts to 
accepting a particular horn of the dilemma as opposed to solving the dilemma.15 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper presented a dilemma for the additive model of reasons. The model can 
accommodate disjunctive cases in which one ought to 𝜙 just in case at least one of 
two factors obtains if, and only if, it cannot accommodate conjunctive cases such 
that one ought to 𝜙 just in case both of two factors obtains. Hence the model can 
accommodate conjunctive or disjunctive cases but not both. Furthermore, the same 
dilemma shows up in a revised additive model that allows for imprecisely weighted 
reasons. Because conjunctive and disjunctive cases are ubiquitous, the dilemma 
implies that the additive model is severely extensionally inadequate. Whilst there 
are certain modifications available to the additive model that avoid the dilemma, 
these modifications are inconsistent with comparativism about reasons and incur 
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